OPERATIONAL LIAISON IN COMBINED OPERATIONS: Considerations and Procedures

A Monograph
By
Major Robert J. Botters, Jr.
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 95-96

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. AGENCY USE ONLY *(Leave blank)*	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
		MONOGRAPH

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
OPERATIONAL LIAISON IN COMBINED OPERATIONS: CONSIDERATIONS & PROCEDURES

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)
MAJOR ROBERT J. BOTTERS, JR

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
School of Advanced Military Studies
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE:
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT *(Maximum 200 words)*

SEE ATTACHED

14. SUBJECT TERMS
LIAISON, COMBINED OPERATIONS, COALITION, INTEGRATION

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
49

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNLIMITED

ABSTRACT

OPERATIONAL LIAISON IN COMBINED OPERATIONS: CONSIDERATIONS AND PROCEDURES by Major Robert J. Botters, Jr, U.S. Army, 49 pages.

Although the United States Armed Forces train to fight unilaterally, our historical experience suggests we fight as a multilateral force. Post conflict analysis of coalition command and control often appear to focus on command structures. Although this is the case, we tend to rely on informal solutions to affecting the command and control of allied and coalition command structures.

Joint doctrine identifies two types of combined operations, coalitions and alliances. Coalitions are an informal arrangement of two or more military forces seeking a common objective. An alliance is a more formal arrangement between military forces. The more difficult of the two for integration of combat forces is a coalition. Absent common or standardized procedures, the coalition commander must spend a disproportionate amount of time integrating multinational combat forces into a cohesive, trained, combatant force. U.S. combined operations doctrine is contained in multiple JCS publications and does not adequately address joint tactics, techniques, or procedures for integration of multinational forces in combined operations.

This monograph suggests operational liaison teams can bridge the gap between forming a coalition and employment of the coalition in combat operations. A proactive liaison team with supporting staff infrastructure, can reduce the commander's direct involvement with liaison. Historical examples are the U.S. Fifth Army in WWII, and U.S. Central Command in OPERATION DESERT STORM. Liaison methods utilized in these examples are analyzed to determine the validity of current doctrine and offers a framework for future liaison teams in combined operations.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Robert J. Botters, Jr.

Title of Monograph: Operational Liaison in Combined Operations: Considerations and Procedures.

Approved by:



LTC Michael L. Combest, MMAS — Monograph Director



COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS — Director, School of Advanced Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D. — Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 19th Day of April 1996

Contents

I. Introduction

> A coalition of dissimilar nations may require an indirect approach to achieving unity of effort. The theater commander may use primary staff for planning and an auxiliary staff to absorb, translate and relay straightforward, executable instructions to members of the coalition. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations.[1]
>
> Combined Warfare - Warfare conducted by forces of two or more allied nations in coordinated action toward common objectives. Joint Publication 1-02.[2]

Although the United States Armed Forces train to fight unilaterally, our historical experience suggests we fight as a multi-lateral force. Coalition and alliance command and control often appear to rely on command structures. Although this is the case, we tend to rely on informal solutions to affecting the command and control of allied and coalition formations. General (Retired) Robert Riscassi, former Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea, observed the need for an agreed doctrine and approach to joint and combined operations. He suggests our historic perspective on these operations tend to focus on "personalities, more than methods." He further states doctrine should be based on methods to "communicate commander's intent, battlefield missions, control measures, combined arms and joint procedures and command relationships." [3]

The National Military Strategy (NMS) addresses joint and coalition warfighting but primarily orients on US service component functions, "each service has both a role and primary and collateral functions to execute, for which it must train, organize, and equip its forces." [4] The NMS states integration of these forces in military operations is the responsibility of the combatant commanders, but how is this accomplished? Joint doctrine

identifies requirements for joint liaison officers, yet does not provide specific guidance for the establishment of combined liaison teams. In reality, combined and joint liaison teams are an ad hoc organization. As a power projection force, the United States Armed Forces should be prepared to provide service specific and joint liaison teams to combatant commands.

There are significant differences between the various services as they perform similar functions in air, ground, and maritime operations forces necessitating joint/combined liaison. For example, doctrine and procedures for the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force are dissimilar and compound the difficulty of integrating forces in combat operations. These difficulties are amplified in combined operations. General Riscassi observed:

> In a coalition , the difficulties of joint operations are still prevalent, but with the added dimensions and complexities of two or more national armed forces, all of which bring their separate orientations and proclivities to the practice of warfare.[5]

Execution of coalition operations is a complex task. Historically, the integration of combined air and naval forces is less difficult than the integration of land forces.[6] In the U.S. military's experience with combined operations, ad hoc liaison teams overcame these obstacles, yet lessons learned are not captured in doctrine. Future combatant commands may not have the luxury of time to relearn these lessons.

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, suggests successful coalitions and alliances possess similar traits. These traits are: goals and objectives, military doctrine and training, equipment, cultural differences, language (differences), teamwork and trust.[7] Unity of effort in combined operations requires a linkage between U.S. and coalition

forces and is a significant concern for the joint force commander. There are two methods for achieving this linkage, integrated command structures and combined liaison. Unfortunately, there is an absence of doctrinal publications on combined liaison. U.S. Army TRADOC PAM 525-5, Force XXI Operations, a conceptual framework for Army operations in the Twenty First century states:

> In the area of liaison, expanded training and professional education by CD-ROM based liaison packages must improve liaison team understanding of partner-army organization, equipment, doctrine, or civil agency procedures. Combat will require liaison teams with significant technical abilities to ensure full sharing of information necessary to fully utilize each participant's capabilities.[8]

Yet this does not provide a method or procedure for establishing and integrating forces. General Riscassi notes a doctrinal foundation must be based on methods.[9] The United States Armed Forces have ample experience in modern combined operations which provides a foundation for doctrinal development in combined operations. This monograph analyzes current doctrine and examines the United States experience in two combined operations to identify considerations, and methods for liaison in future combined operations.

Chapter II analyzes current U.S. Army and Joint Chiefs of Staff publications concerning combined liaison. Current doctrinal considerations and procedures for liaison primarily orient on joint/ interservice requirements. A logical extension of the doctrinal framework of considerations is a method or procedures for combined liaison. A method for combined liaison is developed in this monograph by merging available doctrine with considerations and procedures found in modern combined operations.

Chapter III examines the United States Fifth Army's method for conducting

combined operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in World War II. The chapter will examine the role of the liaison in Fifth Army, and the benefits of this liaison with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force during the Italian Campaign. The chapter identifies both methods and key considerations for future combined liaison.

Chapter IV examines the integration of joint and combined forces in OPERATION DESERT STORM. This chapter analyzes how the combat forces of thirty seven coalition nations were integrated into land, air, and maritime operations during the Gulf War. This examination includes methods utilized by the U.S. Armed Forces to effect joint liaison.

Chapter V is an analysis of methods utilized by the U.S. Armed Forces and is added to the framework developed in Chapter II. This provides a recommended liaison model for future coalition commanders. Chapter VI concludes the monograph suggesting the U.S. military is not prepared to rapidly provide combined liaison teams and should consider the recommendations found in Chapter V.

II. Liaison in Army and Joint Doctrine

> Joint operations are the integrated military activities of two or more service components-Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps-of the US military.[10]

> Whether operations are combined (involving members of a formal alliance) or a temporary coalition of other partners, certain considerations are important.[11]

U.S. Army doctrine states Army units must be prepared to integrate with other services and forces from other nations. This integration requires "Robust liaison [which] will facilitate understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment."[12] However, no purpose, function, or method is identified in Army doctrine for joint or combined liaison. Field Manual 100-5's chapter on joint operations is oriented on command relationships and theater structure. Liaison is discussed in a concluding paragraph within the context of combined staffs and tactical liaison. Post OPERATION DESERT STORM analyses recognize the necessity for focusing on joint and combined interoperability:

> "Greater interoperabilty is the trend...With defense budgets shrinking , we need to work together more efficiently. Jointness isn't going away." But when these attitudes are tested operationally, the differences between the services often outweigh the similarities, and cooperation is not easy to achieve.[13]

As noted earlier, these joint difficulties are amplified in combined operations. Field Manual 100-5's chapter on combined operations is focused on considerations, planning, and conduct of combined operations. U.S. Army doctrine directs liaison between "forces of each nation and the next higher headquarters."[14] As with joint operations, a method for conducting combined liaison is not identified.

However, the United States Armed Forces have affected liaison with a multitude of coalition and alliance partners in combat operations from World War II to OPERATION

DESERT STORM. These operational liaison methods have proved successful yet hastily prepared, executed, and just as hastily forgotten, at the conclusion of operations.

Alliance and Coalition Structures

"Combined operations involve the military forces of two or more nations acting together in common purpose."[15] Joint doctrine identifies two types of combined operations, coalitions and alliances. Coalitions are an informal arrangement of two or more military forces seeking a common objective. An alliance is a more formal arrangement between military forces which possess "integrated command structures, broad legitimacy, and habits of cooperation."[16]

The more difficult of the two for integration of combat forces is a coalition. Absent common or standardized procedures, the coalition commander must spend a disproportionate amount of time integrating multinational combat forces into a cohesive, trained, combatant force.

Joint (JCS) doctrine is oriented more on joint / interservice requirements, and less on combined operations. Joint publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, identifies liaison as a subordinate unit function to higher headquarters and adjacent units. The included annex in Joint pub 5-00.2 is general in context and does not include considerations for the complexity of combined liaison. Presently, there is no single JCS doctrinal publication for multinational operations. U.S. combined operations doctrine is contained in multiple JCS publications. JCS publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations is in development, but will only consolidate this dispersed

combined doctrine and not address joint tactics, techniques, or procedures (JTTP's).[17] Unfortunately, JTTP's are quite possibly the linchpin for success in combined operations. General Riscassi notes this necessity for joint and combined procedures:

> Procedures that require multinational forces to operate seamlessly should be practiced routinely. Because of the complexity of joint and combined operations, the required skills atrophy quickly. Training should be joint and reoccur cyclically at the operational and tactical levels. This is essential both to build the basis for trust, which will be vital in war, and to identify the abilities and limitations of coalition forces. For an ad hoc coalition, the same methodology applies, but the time available may be condensed and have to occur during hostilities.[18]

Although an alliance implies standardized procedures and agreements for facilitating integration are present, differing national interests remain an inherent tension. These same tensions are present in coalition operations but are more difficult to overcome. Therefore, considerations and procedures for a liaison framework in coalition operations may provide greater utility for future coalition commanders and staffs than a discussion of joint considerations.

The U.S. Doctrinal Framework for Coalition Integration

The tools required to build a successfully integrated coalition are evident in both doctrine and recent historical experience. Doctrine offers considerations for coalition operations while historical experience provides methods for integration. One coalition does not necessarily reflect another, yet there are factors which appear to be common to all coalitions. Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, identifies considerations for multinational operations and considerations during planning and execution of operations.[19] For multinational operations these are: national goals, unity of

effort, doctrine, training and equipment, cultural differences, management of resources, and national communications. During the planning and execution of operations, rules of engagement, media, local law enforcement, command and control, coordination and liaison, plans and procedures, intelligence, logistics, and protection are added.[20] Where these diverge between coalition members, the coalition has the potential to breakdown. Although joint doctrine lists considerations, are they operational constraints, limiting the coalition's freedom of action? How is their significance determined by the force commander?

Whether these are constraints, or not, is determined by whether the force commander can influence the coalition contingents. The desired end is an integration of combat forces and unity of effort. The commander's personal ability to effect this integration is finite. The vehicle for influencing these considerations are liaison teams. Additionally, the requirement for unity of effort necessitates development of procedures for liaison teams to assess each multinational contingent.

Method for Assessing Coalition Contingents

A potential model for weighing these considerations is a framework similar to the checklist developed by John M. Collins in his article entitled, "Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations".[21] Collins identified considerations to "help US leaders determine whether military power is appropriate " and to "ascertain whether ongoing military operations seem warranted."[22] Collins' descriptive list includes: national interests, threats to national interests (which can be a unifying theme for the coalition),

political aims and military missions, strategic and policy guidance, planning options, resources, congressional and public support.[23] These same considerations are applicable to multinational contingents and have significant impact throughout the execution and planning of operations. The liaison team can provide this assessment for the commander. A review of historical combined operations experiences can expand the list to include: personalities, and alliance/coalition unity. [24] The list of considerations is subjective in analysis and potentially expansive in scope. Yet, the combined force commander and his staff must make an assessment of contributing contingents to ensure unity of effort.

Liaison, the Linkage Between Commanders and Multinational Contingents

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines liaison as "that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action."[25] The necessity for liaison is identified as an organizational consideration in JCS publication 3.0 . Yet these four paragraphs do not adequately address combined liaison requirements, organization, or method of operation. The purpose of joint liaison is to facilitate the integration of joint forces to insure unity of effort. Within combined operations this purpose is expanded to provide the combined forces commander and his staff an appreciation for the military capabilities, personalities, and national interests of coalition nations. In the absence of joint doctrine or method (tactics, techniques, and procedures), the combined force commander must organize his liaison effort and coordinating staff organization to assess and assist the multinational contingents. The

Collins model provides a framework for assessment. To address the considerations identified earlier, the liaison may function as the commander's directed telescope, or as a subsection of the operations section.

The directed telescope as defined by Lieutenant Colonel Gary B. Griffin in, The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command, is the use of " specially selected, highly qualified, and trusted young officers as special agents or observers" by the commander for "obtaining battlefield command information."[26] The study focuses on personal command involvement with liaison officers in combined operations.

As an alternative, this monograph suggests a proactive liaison team with supporting staff infrastructure, can reduce the commander's direct involvement with liaison. Historical examples are the U.S. Fifth Army in WWII, and U.S. Central Command in OPERATION DESERT STORM. Liaison methods utilized in these examples are analyzed to determine the validity of current doctrinal considerations and whether any considerations should be included. Additionally, the methods utilized by liaison teams are offered as JTTP's for future combined liaison.

III. Combined Operations in World War II

United States Fifth Army in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations

> The American Fifth Army in Italy represents the best American, and probably the best Allied, coalition experience in the war. Non-US components composed almost half its manpower. Though not assigned at the same time, Fifth Army fielded three US corps (11 divisions), two British and one Commonwealth corps (six British, one New Zealand, one South African, and three Indian divisions), a French corps (two French, one Algerian, and two Moroccan divisions), two Italian combat groups, and a Brazilian division.[27]

The U.S. Fifth Army was the only numbered Army organized outside the continental United States during World War II. Organized in North Africa, the Fifth Army ended the war during the campaign for Italy. The Mediterranean Theater of Operations was the first combined theater in Europe under U.S. command. After General Eisenhower's departure in 1943, Allied forces in the Mediterranean were commanded by British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, with General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, overall commander of Allied ground forces in Italy. The U.S. contingent commander, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, had organized, trained, and fought the Fifth Army from 1943 to 1944. [28]

Fifth Army Staff Organization

Fifth Army's success as a coalition is attributable to an effective staff organization which developed procedures for receiving, training, and integrating multi-national contingents for combat operations. The staff consisted of the standard general staff and special staff sections. In addition to U.S. personnel "the Army headquarters included British, French, and Italian increments which assisted in the supervision of the

administration of troops of those nationalities which were assigned to the Army."[29] The assignment of increments or combined staff were linked to the size of the contributing nations force. The British and French contingents were the largest with the Italian contingent contributing expertise in areas concerning Italian military and non-military matters.

The integration of disparate national contingents could not be achieved through staff integration alone. The impending arrival of the French Corps necessitated establishing the French Training Section, with a U.S. Army Brigadier General as chief of section. The French Training Section's duties were to "teach and train French personnel in the technical handling of American equipment." [30] Additionally each of the French divisions had an American officer "assigned to act as adviser to the division commander and as a channel of communications between Fifth Army and the individual divisions."[31] The French Training Section's mandate included inspections of the units of the divisions, and coordinating the movements of French units with Fifth Army Headquarters.[32] The integration of British, French and Italian troops in Fifth Army "increased the problems of liaison and supply which had to be surmounted in order to provide an effective fighting force."[33]

Integration of Contingents in Combat Operations

The Fifth Army G-3 section organized with six subdivisions: operations, planning, organization, air-ground liaison, training, information and education.[34] The operations sub-section coordinated both national and combined liaison reports within the Army.

Signal Intelligence and Monitoring platoons (SIAM) were attached to each division headquarters to facilitate communications between division, corps, and army headquarters. These platoons were tasked to monitor division internal frequencies forwarding information of subordinate unit progress to higher headquarters before divisions transmitted the same tactical information.[35] Individual liaison officers from each division and corps operated between their respective units and Army headquarters. Liaison officers were provided to the multinational divisions and corps from Fifth Army. These officers, and liaison officers from subordinate U.S. units, were provided daily briefings at 0930 and reported back each evening. The G3 section provided liaison officers a room for coordinating and posting information on duplicate operations maps. This effort often provided a duplication of tactical information gleaned from unit reports.[36] What proved of more value to the Fifth Army commander and staff was information not transmitted through normal reporting channels. Specifically, the military capability, commander's intentions, and national interests of multi-national contingents. This assessment would be as vital to the conduct of current and future combat operations as were routine G1 through G4 requirements.

These assessments were more difficult to realize in units without representation on the Fifth Army Staff. That a contingent did not have representation on the staff did not lessen its overall value to the campaign in Italy. In fact, these forces were considered vital to the conduct of the campaign since U.S. and British reinforcements were withheld for the impending invasion of west Europe.[37] This required the liaison officer to insert himself into every aspect of a multinational contingent. The Fifth Army's liaison officer

with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force achieved this task in what proved the most difficult, yet mutually beneficial integration of a coalition contingent within the Fifth Army.[38]

The Brazilian Expeditionary Force

The Brazilian contribution to the Allied effort is a direct result of German attacks on shipping in the south Atlantic. Before entering the war, Brazil had contributed basing rights for U.S. aircraft and shipping which reduced the ocean gap for cross Atlantic movement almost in half.[39] U.S. Army Lieutenant General (Retired) Vernon A. Walters, then a Captain, became Fifth Army's liaison with the Brazilians. Captain Walters noted that "For political as well as military reasons it was important that the largest nation in South America take an active part in the war against Germany."[40] To further Brazil's role beyond that of the dominant regional power in South America, Brazil offered an expeditionary force to fight under U.S. command in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.[41] Brazil declared war on Germany , 22 August 1942.

The original Brazilian offer of a three division force organized as U.S. divisions proved logistically insupportable. Transportation assets would have been diverted from other allied efforts.[42] Ultimately, Brazil contributed one divison with replacements, and an aviation squadron in the theater. The difficulties encountered, differences in culture, military organization, and training were not unique to the U.S. and Brazilian relationship, but also existed within the Brazilian force. The differences in U.S./Brazilian military organization and training were mitigated by almost two years of preparation before

commitment in theater.[43] Brazilian officers and soldiers were trained by the U.S. Army in the United States and Brazil before deployment.[44] Once in theater, Fifth Army concluded training for the Brazilians similar to the French Corps in North Africa. This training would be required for U.S. divisions entering theater as well.[45] The Brazilian Expeditionary Force was comprised of three regiments of infantry, each from a separate region of Brazil and with varying degrees of training proficiency.[46] This would become a significant factor during combat operations, confronting the liaison officer with potentially diverging U.S. and Brazilian national interests in combined operations.

Liaison Officer's Methodology at the Tactical Level

The Brazilian Liaison officer was reassigned from duties as aide de camp for the Fifth Army Commander. Both assignments were a result of his ability to speak multiple languages including Portuguese. The request by Major General Mascarenhas, commander of the 1st Brazilian Infantry Divison, cited Captain Walters familiarity with the language, Italy, and the Fifth Army. The General also appeared comfortable with Captain Walters from an introduction and meetings two years earlier in Brazil and the United States.[47]

The formal requirements for liaison officers in Fifth Army were compatible with information requirements of the commander and staff, and not specifically concerned with the gaining unit's national interests. The liaison officer's ability to affect any coordination was limited to the existing communications infrastructure. Fifth Army equipment issued to the BEF liaison unit included individual equipment, one jeep, lantern and stove.[48] Beginning in August 1944 until the end of the war, the liaison officer would report where

Fifth Army and Brazilian national interests diverged with the Fifth Army Staff, and coordinate tactical operations and logistics with IV Corps and adjacent units. [49] The amicable relationship between the liaison officer and BEF commander engendered trust between the liaison officer and regimental and battalion commanders. This access allowed the liaison officer to ensure they understood the Fifth Army and IV Corps commander's intent in operations.[50]

Modern doctrinal considerations for multinational operations identified in the BEF were national goals and cultural differences. Unity of effort, doctrine, training and equipment were almost guaranteed through the preparation of the BEF before arrival in theater.[51] The BEF liaison assessed Fifth Army and BEF considerations in alignment with the Collin's military intervention checklist. Specifically, the BEF liaison officer understood Brazilian national interests, threats to national interests, political aims and military missions, strategic and policy guidance, planning options, resources, and Brazilian government and public support.

Brazil's national interests/goals were to participate in the war against Germany and gain recognition for Brazil's potential as more than a regional power in South America. Threats to these interests were any denigration of the Expeditonary force's conduct of combat operations. Within the BEF the political aims were to prevent one regional regiment from overshadowing any other for unity within the BEF and post-war unity in Brazil.[52]

This became evident during the battle for Monte Castello. The Brazilian commander redesignated the division's main effort from the tested 6th Infantry Regiment

to afford an opportunity for the 11th Infantry Regiment other than a supporting role. While it concerned the liaison officer, he also appreciated the strength of the German defense and the preparation the BEF had undertaken.[53] Additionally, the liaison withheld commenting to Fifth Army and IV Corps.[54] Once Monte Castello had been seized by the 11th Infantry Regiment, after three attacks, the BEF commander accomplished his political aim, providing the 11th Regiment a place in history.[55]

Fifth Army planning options including the BEF were a concern for both the army and the BEF. The liaison officer sought to ameliorate the concerns at Fifth Army by advertising BEF strengths in patrolling and small unit operations.[56] Management of resources were less of a concern for the BEF than Fifth Army . This proved to be a cultural difference rather than mismanagement. The Fifth Army had to adjust standard ration menus and issue of cold weather clothing as most Brazilian soldiers had never been introduced to severe winter weather, nor American rations.

Analysis

The operational importance of the BEF to Fifth Army was the reinforcement by a divison when the Italian campaign became a secondary theater for the allies. Elements of the BEF fought from the Gothic line to the end of the war and received the surrender of the first German Division in Europe. The emergence of Brazil on the world stage could have proven an insignificant event without the support of Fifth Army. Committing the BEF in active combat achieved Fifth Army operational objectives and Brazilian national interests. Possibly neither would be achieved without the support of the liaison officer. The

longterm result is that this is still a period of great interest to the Brazilian people and a unifying linkage between the United States and Brazil.

Liaison in Fifth Army was an assigned function of the army G3 operations section and weighted to provide commanders tactical information. Success was achieved in spite of the fact that Fifth Army's organization did not include a thorough preparation of liaison officers, and an assessment of multinational interests were not considered a priority information requirement. Once tasked, a liaison officer received no guidance on combined operations considerations. A disregard for the political aims of the multinational contingents could have led to acrimonious debate within the army over missions and national interests. These were avoided by a liaison officer's proactive involvement and assessment of coalition interests.

Current doctrinal considerations appear valid, but not specific enough for assessing coalition nation interests and their effect on operations. The efforts of then Captain Walters to evaluate the BEF provide some measurement of Collins model's utility for coalitions with mainly cultural differences. But can the model prove effective in a coalition with multinational contingents comprised of dissimilar organizations? The use of liaison in OPERATION DESERT STORM provides an opportunity to observe recent combined liaison operations for areas of doctrinal improvement.

IV. Combined Liaison in OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM

> Command and control of a coalition military force, as for a single-nation force, takes place at four interlocking levels: political, strategic, operational, and tactical. From the outset, the challenge to the Mideast coalition was to achieve superior performance at all four levels. The coalition had only one opportunity to get it right: it appears to have succeeded.[57]

The successful conduct of coalition operations in OPERATION DESERT STORM provides the United States Armed Forces an opportunity to address the validity of combined operations doctrine and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures. The rapid integration of the thirty seven coalition nations in air, land, and maritime operations within one theater of war exceeded the scope and pace of combined operations during any other period in U.S. military history. Yet this integration was not a fluid process and often identified as a point of contention between the Joint Force Commander, HRH, LTG Khaled bin Sultan, and the Commander, United States Central Command, General Schwarzkoph.[58] Although personalities are not a consideration in combined operations planning , in fact, a focus on personalities often overrides most assessments of coalition operations. This suggests command personality is a valid consideration for combined operations. During this operation, personalities provide little if any utility for assessment of combined operations doctrine.[59]

The yeoman efforts at integration during DESERT STORM were conducted by liaison teams from the United States to the multinational contingents with a possible exception of the British Army contingent. Initially assigned to fight with the U.S. Marines before reassignment with the U.S. VII Corps, the British contingent was able to successfully integrate with the Marines "at all levels."[60] An analysis of the integration of

the British 7th Armoured Brigade with the U.S. Marine Corps provides an opportunity to validate considerations for combined operation planning and integration between symmetric forces. Similarly, the replacement of the 7th Armoured Brigade by the U.S. Army's 2d Armored Division's Tiger Brigade is an opportunity to address considerations for joint operations doctrine and TTP's.

U.S. / UK Integration and Combined Liaison

> Conducting liaison with allied forces requires a degree of robustness in terms of equipment, personnel and skills which differs with that of liaison with U.S. forces and differs from ally to ally depending on the degree of sophistication of the allied force.[61]

The integration of U.S. and British forces occurred at both the operational and tactical levels in theater. At the operational level, the British desired integration "within the American planning staff in order that they could represent a British view and influence both the overall plan and the use of British forces within that plan."[62] In a post war assessment on the effectiveness of U.S./ UK integration, the British Forces Commander notes "this role played by these British officers in American operational planning was duplicated at all levels of operational command. There were about 100 British officers from all three services in various key positions in the U.S. command system. The integration not only bred confidence, understanding and goodwill, but ensured at all levels that our forces were properly used and deployed."[63]

This combined staff integration was reminiscent of operational staffs during World War II and vital to the combined operations consideration, unity of effort. The size of the

British commitment did not warrant the establishment of an independent British zone in theater.[64] Subsequently, the British 7th Armoured Brigade was designated for commitment with the U.S. I Marine Expeditionary Force. Before releasing tactical control to the Marines, the British Forces Commander (BFC) and 7th Armoured brigade commander believed they must overcome U.S. perceptions of inadequacies in their desert training and equipment preparation. This proved both a political aim and military mission for the brigade commander who pursued an aggressive train up to include live fire exercises on an scale unprecedented for the brigade. By 16 November 1990, the brigade commander and BFC determined this "aim of confidence building had been met."[65] Subsequently, the brigade commander "declared ourselves operationally ready to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and took up our position in the defense of Saudi Arabia as part of the 1st Marine Division."[66] The method of liaison while the British were under tactical control of the Marines would not resemble the combined liaison found in other coalition forces. The British had traditional relationships with the U.S. Army in Europe, but found differences in Army and Marine procedures an area of concern.[67] The desired integration was attained through the assignment of British personnel to the Marine headquarters and attachment of ANGLICO's to the British staff. Additionally, the personalities of both the British and Marine commanders facilitated the integration of the forces.[68]

As additional forces were introduced in theater, the I MEF became a supporting effort in offensive plans with the main attack conducted by U.S. Army units. The BFC identified this as a threat to British national interests, both "military and political" and conducted a personal campaign to realign the British Army contingent with the U.S.

Army's VII Corps.[69] This necessitated establishing both a combined staff and liaison with VII Corps.

Within the VIIth Corps, the British staff officers reported to their dedicated U.S. staff officer and not the British commander. This role was assumed by individual liaison officers at the VII Corps Main and Tactical Command Posts, and by two liaison officers with the 1st Infantry Division. These liaison officers provided a redundant communications network between the commanders of the two contingents .[70] Although accustomed to working with the U.S. Army, and fully integrated with the VII Corps, doctrinal differences required a detailed division order which "catered for the lack of common terminology, drills, and procedures" between the British 1st Armoured Division and U.S. 1st Infantry Division.[71]

Analysis

The successful integration of U.S. and UK ground forces is attributable to several doctrinal considerations for combined operations: commonality of language (culture), unity of effort, coordination and liaison. Interestingly, the areas of greatest tension are identified in Collins considerations; threats to national interests, political aims and military missions. Areas not resolved by liaison were resolved through the personal involvement of commanders (personalities). Of significance is the requirement for liaison officers between symmetric organizations mainly to facilitate communications. Assessments of multinational contingents were easily achieved by commanders while liaison officers and combined staffs addressed the routine information requirements

inherent in combat operations. This does not negate the significance of liaison officers or combined staffs, it does suggest a different requirement for forces which are not similarly compatible.

Combined Liaison with Asymmetric Forces

The commitment of non-allied combatant forces to the coalition presented the theater commander with the task of integrating disparate multinational contingents into a combined force. The task to assess their military capabilities and limitations, and to ensure their integration at the operational and tactical level became two distinct operations. The task of providing tactical level liaison fell to U.S. Army Special Forces. Operational level liaison originated in the Army component of central command (ARCENT) and evolved from reporting directly to the ARCENT staff to the ARCENT commander and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).[72] This integrations could be considered the greatest challenge for the coalition. As General Riscassi noted the greatest difficulty for integration in combined operation is between asymmetric armies. "There may be, and usually are, vast differences in the organizations, capabilities, and cultures of military forces. As a general rule, differences are most severe in ground forces."[73] The liaison methods developed to ensure integration within the coalition provide a foundation for future combined operations.

Tactical Liaison in Combined Operations

Initial liaison responsibilities befell the U.S. Army Special Forces in theater as a

result of their area specific capabilities, " language and cultural orientation skills, wide range of tactical and technical expertise, and levels of training allowed them to perform a wide range of missions supporting coalition forces."[74] Eventually, 109 coordination and training teams of approximately 3-4 soldiers would be created to support the coalition contingents down to battalion level.[75] These teams would accompany each battalion, brigade, and division of the Pan Arab force during the ground offensive.[76] Although not resourced to provide such a large volume of teams, Special Forces teams were augmented with vehicles and communications equipment in theater. These teams became an important link between coalition tactical forces and the theater commander. Their reporting of tactical information, outpacing the tactical reporting through the JFC, provided Central Command's staff an expeditious method of obtaining battlefield intelligence. Special Forces teams also ensured integration between adjacent coalition units. Cultural differences among the Arab contingents were as common as differences between Arab and Western forces. These contingents would not conduct adjacent unit coordination. The Special Forces liaison teams made this coordination a priority throughout the war.[77]

Analysis

This tactical level liaison or coalition warfare support provided the CENTCOM staff a capability for integrating disparate multinational contingents into a combined force. Their regional specific training is unequalled within the current U.S. Army force structure and no similar capability exists other than foreign area officer training. The scale of the

operation overextended U.S. Special Forces regional capability and expertise, yet the result was a successful integration of Pan Arab forces in the coalition. Future coalitions may require a similar effort and rely on other sources within the Army area specific expertise.

Operational Level Combined Liaison

The Third U.S. Army commander identified three roles for his command during the Gulf War: serving as the army component command (ARCENT), a theater army, and a numbered field army. As the army component command, coordination began immediately with the Saudi government for intra-theater support for arriving forces. From this initial coordination, ARCENT liaison would expand to include operational planning for offensive operations with U.S. Army units, Joint Forces Command-North which included Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian, and Kuwaiti forces, Joint Forces Command-East, and the U.S. Marine Corps.[78]

These liaison teams were to provide ARCENT and CENTCOM an operational linkage between U.S. and coalition forces. Where the liaison teams were well received by the coalition nations, the U.S. forces did not appear as receptive with their presence.[79] This chapter addresses the efforts of the liaison teams provided with the coalition forces and their linkage with the tactical liaison provided by the Special Forces coalition warfare support teams.

The concept of an operational liaison apparently originated with the Third Army commander. This liaison would exceed the historical precedent of one or two officers and require an organization "that could be a mini-corps headquarters if it had to be."[80] The

dilemma for the Third Army became where to find the necessary personnel and equipment for the liaison teams. The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Force Development Office provided the necessary assistance and the effort was titled Project 5.[81]

The tactical liaison provided by the 5th Special Forces Group would be operational by mid-September 1990. The ARCENT liaison required more time to acquire personnel, organize teams, deploy in theater, receive ARCENT guidance, and fall in on the assigned coalition headquarters. For some members of liaison team Golf, assigned to the JFC-N, the time between individual notification for deployment and link up with the 1st Egyptian Corps took two months.[82] Acquiring personnel and equipment for Project 5 engendered questions at all levels as to the validity of the requirement. Questions raised by contributing units often delayed the arrival of personnel and equipment. This contributed to teams deploying from CONUS with incomplete equipment lists. Once in theater, this would continue to plague the liaison teams.[83] The teams were organized with approximately thirty five personnel and commanded by a Colonel with War College experience.[84] Increasing requirements for the teams necessitated modifications to the organization. Team Golf operated with approximately fourteen personnel.[85]

These teams were to provide "essential staff expertise and advice on large-scale operations to our coalition partners in addition to working U. S. coalition issues such as communications interface, force modernization and targeting."[86] Although considered a priority by the ARCENT and CENTCOM commanders the staff linkage was not adequately resourced. The concept originated in the ARCENT G3 Operations section, yet

a designated liaison point of contact was not established. Subsequently, teams would have to coordinate and complete actions with various shift officers at ARCENT.[87]

Unlike the Fifth Army in WW II, the liaison teams were incapable of physically reporting to Third Army due to distances and timeliness of reporting requirements. Nor was this a necessary requirement. A robust communications element accompanied each of the seven teams and provided adequate connectivity with ARCENT. Prior to assumption of offensive operations, activities were coordinated directly with ARCENT. After initiation of offensive operations, CENTCOM would bypass ARCENT for access direct to the teams. Additionally, the Third Army commander required the teams to report twice daily through his executive officer.[88] This increased the burden on the liaison teams which also reported to the G3, while continuing to provide assistance to their assigned coalition headquarters.

The synergy between the Special Forces and operational liaison were to prove vital to the effort of the Egyptian Corps. When CENTCOM determined an earlier attack time was warranted throughout the theater, the task of informing the corps commander befell the operational liaison team chief. The difficulty for the Egyptians would become the desynchronization of their offensive plan.[89] To facilitate the Egyptian attack, the Special Forces teams attached to the Egyptian Corps directed close-air support during the initial breach operations.[90] This provided the support desired by the Egyptians and contributed to their agreement to attack early. This was not an insignificant matter as the Egyptian Corps was on the right flank of VII Corps and their attack supported VII Corps. Additionally, the Egyptians were reporting directly to the JFC commander, not CENTCOM. The

communications between the liaison and ARCENT/CENTCOM would prove more efficient than the coalition network, and the linkage between both JFC and CENTCOM provided JFC timely reporting in theater. The operational liaison elements were flexible organizations and transferable as a mobile command and control headquarters in theater. Team Golf was reassigned after combat operations to support the Coalition/Iraqi discussions at Safwan with four hours notification, and the Kuwaiti military as an element of Task Force Freedom.[91] It was subsequently reassigned with twenty four hours notice to Rafah, Saudi Arabia, to coordinate the displaced civilian effort between the Saudi govenment and CENTCOM.[92] The ARCENT liaison assigned to multinational forces within the coalition proved "critical in the coordination of operations between coalition and U.S. units." They also provided a link between the tactical liaison teams the operational requirements of the coalition tactical commanders enabling the tactical liaison to avoid those issues.

Analysis

Coalitions comprised of asymmetric forces have become a post DESERT STORM reality. The lesson learned in combined operations is integration of a coalition military force can not be achieved through diplomatic arrangements or a commander's personal involvement alone. Coalition integration requires tactical and operational liaison, which provides the operational commander an ability to assess military capabilities and political interests of multinational contingents. Additionally, liaison can not be an element of the commander's personal staff. Liaison must be integrated within a section or subsection of

the staff to release the commander to fight the enemy, not the coalition. The robust liaison created for OPERATION DESERT STORM is a proven method, providing a foundation for doctrine and future combined operations. Tactical level liaison combined with an operational liaison proved a better vehicle for ascertaining the considerations of coalition operations in the context of their contingent and the theater commander.

V. Liaison Model

The post Cold War era finds the United States in a unique position as the only nation capable of rapidly projecting forces overseas and possessing geographic commands to protect it's national interests abroad. Within these regional command structures, our forces must be prepared to rapidly receive, assess, and integrate traditional allies, non-allied nations, and even former adversaries in military operations. In the absence of doctrinal perspectives or method, the tasks above could prove a limiting factor for rapidly executing coalition operations. Fortunately, the United States is "able to draw upon a long history of allied military operations and from that history, derive a perspective for our future combined warfighting needs."[93] The historical perspectives reviewed in this monograph identify three components for operational liaison in coalition operations: personnel and equipment, staff organization, and considerations for integrating U.S. and coalition military forces.

Personnel and Equipment

Coalition liaison is too complicated to allow for traditional joint liaison which has subordinate units providing liaison to the higher headquarters. Combined liaison must be an extension of the higher headquarters staff to coordinate operational requirements. Currently, U.S. unified command staff organizations do not include adequate personnel strength to assign these missions from within the command. Therefore, it should be expected that future liaison personnel will continue to augment the combatant command in theater.

The size of the liaison team will depend on whether the coalition is comprised of allies, symmetric, or asymmetric military forces. Liaison requirements with allies have the advantage of a common reference for doctrine, training and equipment, and probably national interests. This should reduce the requirement for large operational liaison teams to smaller teams which can provide an alternative method of communicating between contingents. Additional liaison requirements can be achieved through the establishment of combined staffs, a traditional feature of allied operations, and traditional tactical liaison between adjacent and reinforcing units.

Liaison between non-allied or asymmetric military forces require a degree of robustness that resembles the method developed during OPERATION DESERT STORM. The size of the multinational contingent may not necessitate a "mini-corps headquarters", but it is not unreasonable to expect it will require a larger liaison element than one or two individuals communicating tactical combat information.[94] Additionally, multinational contingents may arrive in theater without adequate combat power requiring tactical liaison with reinforcing units. A focus on tactical liaison alone can not accommodate operational issues. Therefore, the operational liaison team must be adequately resourced to address operational and tactical issues. The tactical liaison / operational liaison integration will require the higher liaison team assuming a degree of control over the tactical liaison to ensure unity of effort. This relationship will prove more difficult between U.S. conventional and unconventional forces than between similar forces. This difficulty can be mitigated by a synchronized liaison plan at the theater level.

The resourcing of personnel for operational liaison can be facilitated by the

identification of requirements by the unified commands and coordination between the unified commands and services to pre-designate the necessary personnel. Within the Army, TDA units could battle roster positions for liaison teams to specific unified commands. This will reduce the stress on the MTO&E units and capitalize on the depth of experience in TDA organizations. Another option may be the activation of reserve personnel with area and language expertise. Additionally, the unified commands possess the ability to conduct liaison rehearsals in conjunction with scheduled joint and combined exercises. This would address the concerns identified earlier by General Riscassi, " because of the complexity of joint and combined operations, the required skills atrophy quickly. Training should be joint and reoccur at the operational and tactical levels."[95]

Equipping future opeational liaison teams will prove less difficult as a result of OPERATION DESERT STORM. The U.S. Third Army was tasked by the Army Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, to maintain the equipment utilized by the operational liaison teams for future Army wide use.[96] Training with this equipment during joint and combined exercises will enhance team building, and provide opportunity for improvements to these future liaison teams. This may also reduce the time required for deployment of liaison teams during future operations.

Staff Organization

The inummerable tasks inherent in integrating coalition operations exceeds the ability of any one person to coordinate the effort. This means the commander should not consider the operational liaison team an element of his personal staff. This does not

suggest direct communications are unwarranted. Instead they should be reserved for issues of operational necessity. The theater staff should assume responsibility for the operational liaison teams. Utilizing the Fifth Army's method of designating a liaison section within G3 to coordinate reporting and processing requirements proved an efficient organization. The operational linkage in DESERT STORM, may have proved more efficient had the ARCENT G3 and CENTCOM CJ3 been similarly organized.[97] This organization therefore is a requirement for both the Army component and unified command staffs in coalition operations.

Reporting Linkage

The reporting linkage for operational concerns in Fifth Army was limited to the single liaison officer. All other reporting oriented on tactical information.[98] During the Gulf War, operational issues were relayed by both the operational teams through ARCENT, and tactical liaison teams through 5th Special Forces Group to USSOCCENT.[99] This redundancy will likely remain and should not be considered detrimental to unity of effort. Cooperation between the operational and tactical liaison does not assume the requirement for all reporting to originate with one element. Once the relationship between liaison teams is established by the theater commander, the teams will achieve the appropriate level of integration. The theater staff will have to recognize the dual reporting and establish procedures for resolving conflicting reports.

Integrating coalition staff officers within a combined staff can alleviate some tension inherent in integrating coalition forces. As evidenced by the British in

OPERATION DESERT STORM, this is more easily achieved between traditional allies than between non-traditional allies in a coalition. These staff officers are assigned to facilitate their contingent's integration in theater, not to report to their contingent commander. However, it can contribute to coalition unity if a contingent desires a visible staff representation. These positions are anticipated in planning coalition operations. Considerations for coalition operations and a method for assessing the coalition contingents become the final linkage for integration of coalition contingents in combined operations.

Considerations for Liaison Teams in Coalition Operations

Doctrinal considerations for coalition operations have more utility for planning to form a coalition at the strategic level of war, rather than planning and executing operational liaison teams. The doctrinal considerations are developed from historical experiences, but are considerations for the home team, the United States, and do not adequately address the requirements of the visitors, coalition forces. Since considerations are subjective by nature, a list of considerations can be expansive. In the absence of a doctrinal procedure, this chapter proposes the liaison team conduct its assessment based on a modification to the Collins model checklist. Specifically, the operational liaison officer's assessment is to gain insight to the degree of commitment, personalities, and commitment of the multinational contingent within the coalition.

The task is not as daunting or subject to error as one may assume. Successful liaison officers and teams have conducted similar assessments without the benefit of preparatory

training or guidance. Therefore the utility of the assessment is that it can be rapidly conducted and developed for the theater commander.

The Collins model was developed not to provide answers, but to pose questions for U.S. policy makers when considering military interventions.[100] These same considerations can be evaluated by the liaison team. The assessment should be conducted from the perspective of the multinational contingent, not the United States. Areas where there are divergent or conflicting views should be addressed immediately to ensure unity of effort within the coalition. These "key considerations" are: national interests, threats to national interests, political aims and military missions, strategic and policy guidance, planning options, resources, governmental and public support, and personalities.[101] Personalities are not a key consideration in Joint doctrine or the Collins checklist. It's reoccurrence in history suggests inclusion in any assessment is appropriate. The considerations and a brief description follow.

National interests should be addressed to determine commonality and compatibility with coalition interests. Threats to national interests should be determined as what threats will have an adverse effect on the conduct of military operations within the coalition. These threats may also provide a unifying theme for the coalition if similar to other nation's threats. Strategic and operational policy guidance will change a lot during the conduct of military operations. The assessment must address the effect of changes on the coalition effort.

Political aims and military missions are two distinct but related areas. Political aims must be assessed to determine to what degree is the contingent allowed to conduct

combat operations. Are the political aims achieved by arriving in theater without a willingness to engage in offensive operations (as occurred in OPERATION DESERT STORM). After assessing the political aims, appropriate military missions can be tasked from the coalition.

Planning options involve an assessment of both military capabilities and policy guidance. A contingent should not receive tasks greater than it's ability or mandate. Resources are a significant consideration as most nations do not possess the ability to arrive in theater with adequate combat power or logistical infrastructure. Liaison teams must determined resource requirements and whether there are compatible sources within the theater. Governmental and public support is difficult to assess yet the liaison team can present observations and recommendations to the theater commander that ensures coalition activities do not erode support for multinational contingents.

Finally, personalities must be assessed to determine how they will impact relationships between the contingent and the coalition and within the contingent. This is not suggesting a work around is appropriate, rather it will facilitate interoperability and unity of effort at the command level.

These considerations are subjective, yet offer a framework for assessment of coalition contingents. The ability to achieve unity within a coalition is enhanced by an appreciation for the considerations confronting each contingent. Once known by the coalition commander and staff, areas of potential divergence can be avoided and preserve unity of effort throughout the conduct of military operations. The scope of the task necessitates an operational liaison, integrated within the theater staff.

VI. Conclusions

> Combined operations capitalize on our peace time training, help generate and sustain international support, and enable our forces to provide the high leverage capabilities required to achieve decisive outcomes against any adversary.[102]

Are the United States Armed Forces prepared to rapidly provide service specific and joint liaison teams to combatant commands in the future? The short answer is No. To rapidly provide future liaison teams will require the unified commands to identify requirements, notify the Service Components of these requirements, and train the identified personnel. The process is further complicated by the lack of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for combined liaison in doctrine, hence the reliance on historical experience to identify a method for executing combined liaison.

Combined liaison is too important to rely on ad hoc methods. If the United States is serious about its leadership role in any future coalition, the Armed Forces should be training and resourcing operational liaison teams.

Liaison teams are the theater commander's tool to bridge the gap between diplomatic efforts at the strategic level of war to form a coalition, and the operational employment of the coalition in combat operations. History has shown that requirements vary between allied and non-allied nations, yet they all "bring their separate orientations and proclivities to the practice of warfare."[103] The liaison team can provide the theater commander and his staff a means for overcoming these distinct national issues, by providing an assessment of the military capabilities, personalities, and national interests of coalition nations.

The ability to achieve unity of effort within a coalition is within the theater

commanders reach, if the proper tools are utilized. The considerations and procedures for a liaison framework developed in the previous chapter offer future coalition commanders and staffs a method for ensuring unity of effort in combined operations.

Notes

1. United States Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, June 1993, p. 5-3.

2. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, p. 78.

3. Robert W. Riscassi, GEN, USA, "Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment: A Necessity", Military Review, June 1993, p. 21.

4. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, 1995, p. 14.

5. Ibid., p. 21.

6. Riscassi, p. 29.

7. Field Manual 100-5, p. 5-2 - 5-3.

8. U.S. Army TRADOC PAM 525-5, Force XXI Operations, p. 3-22

9. Riscassi, p. 21.

10. FM 100-5, p. 4-1.

11. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 Jan 1995, p. III-13.

12. FM 100-5, p. 2-2.

13. Dennis Palzkill, Lieutenant, USN, "Making Interoperability Work", Proceedings, Sept 1991, p. 50.

14. FM 100-5, p. 5-5.

15. Ibid., p. 5-1.

16. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1995, p. 26.

17. Joint Publication 1-01.1, Compendium of Joint Publications, 25 April 1995, p. III-2.

18. Riscassi, p. 33.

19. Joint Publication 3.0, Chapter VI, p. VI-1 thru VI-16.

20. Ibid.

21. John M. Collins, "Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations", Parameters, Vol XXV, No. 4, Winter 1995-96, p. 53.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Riscassi, p. 21.

25. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 217.

26. Gary B. Griffin, LTC, USA, The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1985, reprinted 1991, p. 1.

27. Wayne A. Skillet, LTC (USA, Retired), "Alliance and Coalition Warfare", Parameters, (Summer 1993, Vol. XXIII, No.2) p. 75.

28. Earnest R. Fisher, Jr. U.S. Army In World War II The Mediterranean Theater of Operations Cassino to the Alps, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1977) p. 9.

29. Fifth Army History, Part VIII, p. 53

30. Ibid., Part I, p. 11.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., Part III, p. 11.

34. Ibid., Part VIII, p. 54.

35. Ibid., Part VIII, p. 55.

36. Ibid, p. 56.

37. Vernon A. Walters, LTG, US Army (RET), Silent Missions, (Doubleday & Co, New York, 1978) p. 83.

38. Personal interview with Colonel Alvaro de Souza Pinhiero, Brazilian Liaison Officer, United States Command and General Staff College, January 27, 1996. COL Alvaro's observations are based on the book, The Brazilian Expeditonary Force By Its Commander, Rio de Janiero, 1965, by General J.B. Masacarenhas de Morae, Commanding General, 1st Brazilian Expeditionary Force. This publication has not been translated in English.

39. Walters, p. 70

40. Ibid., p. 71.

41. Ibid., p. 70-71.

42. Ibid., p. 76.

43. The first elements of the BEF would enter theater in August 1944, with the main body arriving by October 1944.

44. Ibid., p. 77-78. Brazilian officers were trained at Ft. Leavenworth to include a tactical training exercise where allied forces were to invade the European continent similar to the Normandy invasion.

45. Fifth Army History, Part VII, p. 173. The U.S. Army's 92d divison would also arrive in theater at approximately the same time.

46. Colonel Alvaro interview, 27 February 1996.

47. Walters, p. 116.

48. Walters, p. 117.

49. Ibid.

50. Colonel Alvaro interview.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Walters, p. 124.

54. Colonel Alvaro interview.

55. The 11th Infantry Regiment is the pride of the State of Minas Gerrais in N. Central Brazil. The regiment's current designation as mountain troops was the focus of a Discovery Channel documentary and highlighted the regiment's efforts in the battle of Monte Castello.

56. Walters, p. 120 & 136.

57. John H. Cushman, LTG (Retired), USA, "Command and Control in the Coalition", (Proceedings, Vol 117/5/1,059, May 1991) p. 74.

58. HRH General Khaled bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, (HarperCollins, New York, 1995), p. 191.

59. Riscassi, p. 21.

60. P.A. Cordingly, Brigadier, DSO, UK Army, "The Gulf War: Operating with Allies", (RUSI Journal, Vol 137, No. 2, April 1992) p. 19.

61. Daniel M. Ferezan, Colonel, U.S. Army, Chief, Liaison Team Golf, ARCENT Project 5. Quoted from Colonel Ferezan's After Action Report for the Commander, Third Army, 31 March 1991.

62. Sir Peter De La Billiere, General, Royal Army, "The Gulf War: Planning and Execution", (RUSI Journal) p. 9.

63. Ibid.

64. Sir Peter De La Billere, Storm Command: A Personal Account of The Gulf War. (HarperCollins, London, 1992) p. 82.

65. Cordingly, p. 18.

66. Ibid.

67. De La Billiere, Storm Command, p. 95.

68. Ibid., p. 95.

69. Ibid., p. 94.

70. Rupert Smith, Major General, Royal Army, "The Gulf War: The Land Battle", (RUSI Journal, Vol 137 No. 1, Feb 1992) p. 4. MG Smith commanded the British 1st Armoured Division in ODS.

71. Ibid., p. 4.

72. DOD Title V Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992. p. 494.

73. Riscassi, p. 30.

74. DOD Title V Report, p. 528.

75. PAO, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "Special Operations in Desert Storm: Separating Fact From Fiction", (Special Warfare, March 1992) p. 3.

76. U.S. Army Special Forces Report, Army Special Operations Forces in Desert Storm, Executive Summary. p. i.

77. Special Forces Interview with LTC Daniel Brownlee, Commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, Special Warfare, July 1993) p. 42.

78. John J. Yeosock, LTG, USA, "Army Operations in the Gulf Theater", (Military Review, Vol LXXI No. 9, September 1991) p. 9.

79. Mark B. Yates, LTC, USA, "Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm", (Military Review, Vol LXXIII No 10, October 1993) p. 48.

80. Richard M. Swain, "Lucky War" Third Army in Desert Storm, (USACGSC Press, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1994) p. 146-147.

81. Ibid., p. 146.

82. Ferezan, p. 2.

83. Ferezan, Annex A.

84. Swain, p. 147.

85. Personal interview with LTC, USA, Michael L. Combest, Team Golf Operations officer, April 11, 1996.

86. Yeosock, p. 9.

87. Ferezan, p. A-3.

88. Swain p. 149.

89. Ferezan, AAR.

90. William S. Johnson, Major, USA, unpublished monograph. Major Johnson was assigned with the 2d Battalion 5th Special Forces Group during OPERATION DESERT STORM. He accompanied the 1st Egyptian Corps during combat operations.

91. Ferezan, p. C-7&8.

92. Personal interview with LTC Combest.

93. John D. Becker, Major, USA, "Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The American Experience", (Military Review, Vol LXXIII No 11, Nov 1993) p. 25.

94. Swain, p. 146.

95. Riscassi, p. 33.

96. Yates, p. 52.

97. Ferezan, p. A-3.

98. Fifth Army History, Part VIII, p. 55.

99. Yates, p. 51.

100. Collins, p. 53.

101. Collins, p. 53.

102. NMS, p. 13.

103. Riscassi, p. 21.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES

Becker, John D.,"Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The American Experience", Military Review, Nov 1993, 25-29.

Collins, John M., "Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations", Parameters, Vol XXV, No 4, Winter 1995-96, 53-58.

Cordingly, P, Brigadier, Royal Army, "The Gulf War: Operating With Allies", RUSI Journal, April 1992, 17-20.

Cushman, John, LTG, USA, "Fight as a Team", Proceedings, Jan 1993, 58-62.

Cushman, John, LTG, USA, "Command and Control in the Coalition", Proceedings, May 1991, 74-80.

De La Billiere, GEN, Royal Army, "The Gulf Conflict: Planning and Execution", RUSI Journal, Dec 1991, 7-12.

Evans, David, "With the Army and the Air Force", Proceedings, June 1991, 62-64.

Freeman, Waldo D., MG, USA, "The Challenges of Combined Operations", Military Review, Nov 1992, 3-11.

Kirkpatrick, Charles E., "Joint Planning for Operation Torch", Parameters, Summer 1991, 73-85.

Mangum, Ronald S., "The Vicksburg Campaign: A Study in Joint Operations", Parameters, 74-86.

Michaelis, Marc, LTC, USA, "The Importance of Communicating in Coalition Warfare", Military Review, Nov 1992, 40-50.

Napier, K., LCDR, Royal Navy, "With the British in the Gulf", Proceedings, June 1991, 65-66.

Palzkill, Dennis, Lieutenant, USN, "Making Interoperability Work", Proceedings, Sept 1991, 50-54.

Riscassi, Robert W., GEN, USA, "Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment, A Necessity", Military Review, June 1993, 20-37.

Silkett, Wayne A., "Alliance and Coalition Warfare", Parameters, Summer 1993, 74-85.

Smith, Rupert, MG, Royal Army, "The Gulf War: The Land Battle", RUSI Journal, Feb 1992, 1-5.

Yates, Mark B., LTC, USA, "Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm", Military Review, Oct 1993, 46-52.

Yeosock, John J., LTG, USA, "Army Operations in the Gulf Theater", Military Review, Sept 1991, 2-15.

_____, "Special Operations in Desert Storm: Separating Fact From Fiction", Special Warfare, March 1992, 2-6.

_____, "Special Forces Interview with LTC Daniel Brownlee, Commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group", Special Warfare, July 1993, 40-44.

BOOKS

Atkinson, Rick, Crusade The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1993.

Blackwell, James, MG, USA, Thunder in the Desert. New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1991.

Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Cohen, Eliot, and Gooch, John, Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York, NY: Free Press, 1990.

De La Billere, Peter, GEN, Royal Army, Storm Command A Personal Account of the Gulf War. London, UK: Harper Collins, 1992.

Fisher, Earnest R. (Editor), U.S. Army in World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Cassino to the Alps, Washington DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1977.

Gordon, Michael R., Trainor, Bernard E., LTG, USMC, The General's War, The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.

McKnight, Clarence E., LTG, USA, Control of Joint Forces. Fairfax, VA: Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, 1989.

Starr, Chester G., From Salerno to the Alps A History of the Fifth Army 1943-45. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal, 1948. Reprinted by the Battery Press, Nashville, TN, 1979.

Sultan, Khaled Bin, HRH, Desert Warrior. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

Summers, Harry G., On Strategy II, A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York, NY: Dell Publishing, 1992.

Walters, Vernon A., Silent Missions, (New York: Doubleday, 1978

Watson, Bruce W, editor, Military Lessons of the Gulf War. London, UK: Greenhill Books, 1991.

STUDIES AND MONOGRAPHS

Bull, Stephen D., "Implementing JSCP in the NATO Arena: The Challenge of Planning for Coalition Warfare", Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1992.

Goff, D.G., "Building Coalitions for Humanitarian Operations, Operation Provide Comfort" Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1992.

Griffin, Gary B., "The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command", Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1985.

Johnson, William S, MAJ, USA, unpublished monograph, "United States Army Special Forces in Desert Shield/ Desert Storm How Significant an Impact", Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

Maxwell, Barry A, MAJ, USA, "Establishing Theater Command and Control In a Coalition of Nations: Requirements for US Doctrine", Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.

Moore, Joseph A., MAJ, USA, "Coalition Command and Control: Essential Considerations", Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 14 May 1993.

Schissler, M.O., "Coalition Warfare: More Power or More Problems?" Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993.

Tucker, Craig A., Major, USMC, "Band of Brothers: The 2D Marine Division and the Tiger Brigade in the Persian Gulf War" , Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army

Command and General Staff College, 17 December 1994.

U.S. MILITARY & GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Annual Report, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 1995.

_____, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Washington DC: Department of Defense, April 1992.

Cohen, Eliot, editor, Gulf War Air Power Survey. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1993.

Ferezan, Daniel M. "Project 5/Liaison Team Golf After Action Report, 31 March 1991." Gulf War Collection, Group Scales Papers, Combined Arms Library, Ft Leavenworth, KS.

Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, June 1993.

Field Manual 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, May 1995.

Field Manual 100-8, Combined Army Operations. (Preliminary Draft) Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 29 Jan 1992.

_____, Fifth Army History, The War Department, Washington, D.C., on Microfilm, Combined Arms Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff.

Joint Publication, 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, Washington DC: The Joint Staff.

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff.

Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff.

_____, National Military Strategy, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1995.

Scales, Robert, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1994.

Swain, Richard, COL, USA, "Lucky War" Third Army in Desert Storm. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994.

The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1995.

TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5, Force XXI Operations, A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century. Ft. Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August 1994.

_____, "Army Special Operations Forces in Desert Storm, Executive Summary", US Army Special Forces.

Personal Interviews

Personal Interview with Colonel Alvaro de Souza Pinhiero, Brazilian Liaison Officer, United States Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 27 January 1996.

Personal Interview with Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Michael L. Combest, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 11 April 1996.